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Abstract
State governments receive an exogenous tax windfall whenever their residents win
a multi-state lottery. These lottery tax windfalls are counter-cyclical but occur during
a range of economic conditions. Therefore, lottery tax windfalls enable us to estimate
the impact of fiscal policy on consumption during bust as well as boom periods to
account for time-varying household borrowing constraints. Furthermore, lottery tax
windfalls facilitate increased government spending or tax reductions without the issuance
of debt, thereby circumventing Ricardian equivalence. We find evidence that lottery tax
windfalls facilitate higher government expenditures on Supplementary Security Income
that increase household consumption, but only during bust periods. Overall, the ability
of fiscal policy to influence consumption is limited to higher expenditures during poor
economic conditions.
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1 Introduction
Measuring the impact of government fiscal policy on consumption is a challenge since gov-
ernment fiscal policies are endogenous with respect to economic conditions. Indeed, stimulus
measures are usually limited to bust periods, which complicates our understanding of the
relationship between fiscal policy and consumption. Parker (2011) states that:
“Unfortunately, we have very little evidence on whether the government multiplier differs
with the state of the economy ... research sometimes finds evidence of larger effects of govern-
ment spending in recessions, the evidence is statistically weak, highlighting the real reason for
our lack of knowledge: lack of data” page 704-705
According to Ricardian equivalence (Barro-Ricardo equivalence theorem), government
budget deficits cannot stimulate consumption since households increase savings in antici-
pation of future tax increases. Furthermore, government budget deficits are unnecessary to
finance consumption provided households can borrow against their future labor income. How-
ever, household borrowing constraints (Zeldes, 1989) and difficulties hedging unemployment
(Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1994) enable increased government expenditures and / or tax
reductions to increase consumption.1
We utilize 147 exogenous tax windfalls from multi-state lotteries to examine the influence
of fiscal policy on household consumption. These tax windfalls arise from PowerBall and
MegaMillion lotteries between 1998 to 2009. Lottery tax windfalls occur during boom and
bust periods, while the federal tax rebates examined by Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006)
as well as Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011) are limited to bust periods in
2001 and 2008, respectively. These tax rebates were distributed via Social Security Numbers,
making them random in the cross-section but not across time. In contrast, the lottery tax
windfalls we study are random along both dimensions.
Without observing fiscal policy shocks in boom periods, one cannot reject the possibility
that higher government expenditures or lower taxation can always increase consumption. Fur-
thermore, our study exploits heterogeneity regarding the severity of economic fluctuations and
fiscal policy across states. Therefore, our study can address the possibility that time-varying
household borrowing constraints alter the relationship between fiscal policy and consumption.
Lotteries are a significant source of revenue for state governments. About 25% of the
revenue from the sale of lottery tickets goes to state governments, with over $16 billion added
to state coffers in 2012.2 This lottery revenue is approximately 2% to 3% of total state revenue,
1In Lucas (1994), investors self-insure themselves against transitory shocks to labor income through precau-
tionary savings. However, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) report that precautionary savings provide
inadequate insurance against prolonged losses of income (unemployment).
2Does Powerball really boost the economy? Chris Isidore @CNNMoney published on November 27th, 2012.
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and relatively stable since it is derived from ticket sales. In contrast, approximately 60% of
the total revenue from a lottery is paid out as winnings. These lottery winnings generate
exogenous lottery tax windfalls for states whose residents win a multi-state lottery.3
Forty three states participate in multi-state lotteries while forty one states are identified as
being fiscally constrained by either their balanced budget amendment or budget stabilization
fund. These fiscal constraints are described in the next section. In general, fiscally constrained
states participate in multi-state lotteries. Specifically, thirty seven of the forty one fiscally
constrained states participate in multi-state lotteries. Our main sample consists of the forty
one fiscally constrained states.
We report that lottery tax windfalls increase state government expenditures on supple-
mentary security income, but only during bust periods. Furthermore, higher expenditures
on social security income facilitated by lottery tax windfalls during bust periods increase
consumption. McKay and Reis (2013) argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that
targeting inequality through transfer programs is better at stabilizing aggregate demand than
programs designed to stabilize disposable income such as progressive income taxes.4 In the
absence of lottery tax windfalls, state-level expenditures on social security income and con-
sumption both decline during bust periods. The negligible impact of lottery tax windfalls on
consumption during boom periods is consistent with the alleviation of time-varying household
borrowing constraints.
Several robustness tests confirm the ability of lottery tax windfalls to facilitate increased
spending on social security impact and consequently increase consumption. The revenue of
earnings of firms whose operations are geographically concentrated in the state receiving the
lottery tax windfall both increase during bust periods. Conversely, in the absence of a lottery
tax windfall, earnings decrease during bust periods. In addition, consistent with the impor-
tance of household borrowing constraints being alleviated by social security income payments,
state government spending on highways does not impact consumption. Furthermore, the effect
of state-year lottery tax windfalls is crucial since randomly shuffling the timing of these wind-
falls does not result in significantly higher expenditures on social security income or higher
consumption during bust periods. Additional robustness tests are outlined later in the paper.
The remainder of this paper begins with an introduction to our data in Section 2. Our
empirical results are then presented in Section 3 along with the results from several robustness
tests. Our conclusion follows in Section 4.
3Advertising expenses and sales commissions to retail stores comprise the remaining 15% of lottery revenue.
4McKay and Reis (2013) also identify food stamps as an important program to stabilize aggregate de-
mand. However, Food Stamps are issued by the federal government (US Department of Agriculture) not state
governments.
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2 Data
The primary source of lottery data is from the website www.portalseven.com that contains
the location of Power Ball and Mega Million lottery winners.5 Factiva is also used to supple-
ment incomplete information. The lottery data contains three important fields; date, winning
amount, and state in which the winner reside.
A brief example of the data from this website is reported below:
30-Mar-12 $656 Million The Three Amigos Maryland
Merle and Patricia Butler Illinois
Anonymous Kansas
24-Jan-12 $72 Million Marcia Adams Georgia
27-Dec-11 $208 Million Daniel Bruckner New York
1-Nov-11 $78 Million Charles Hairston California
30-Sep-11 $114 Million Group of 6 people California
The Jones Family North Carolina
Multi-state lotteries generate revenue for state governments from ticket sales as well as tax
windfalls that arise from in-state lottery winners. Our study focuses exclusively on the latter
since these windfalls represent large positive shocks to at least one state’s revenue. Of the
forty three states that participate in multi-state lotteries, thirty four impose specific taxes on
lottery winnings. However, the distinction between states with and without specific lottery
taxes is not salient since individual income taxes are higher as a result of an in-state lottery
winner.
Our proxy for state-level consumption is retail sales defined by the total annual sales of
the retail industry (NAICS 44-45) in each state. This consumption proxy has previously been
used by Ostergaard, Sorensen, and Yosha (2002) and Korniotis (2008). Gross State Product
(GSP) is an annual measure of each state’s economic output. State revenue and expenditure
are defined as the total annual amount of revenue and spending, respectively, of each state.
Supplementary Security Income (SSI) represents annual contributions by state governments
to low income households consisting of individuals aged sixty five and older as well as disabled
individuals. These SSI contributions by state governments are in excess of contributions
from the federal government.6 GSP and SSI for each state are obtained from the US Census
Bureau’s Compendia database.
The impact of lottery tax windfalls on state-level fiscal policy is predicted to be greater in
states that are fiscally constrained. Intuitively, states that cannot issue debt to finance tax
5Early in our sample, these lotteries were previously known as The Big Game.
6Federal SSI funding is from the US Treasury not the Social Security Trust Fund.
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reductions or increased spending during bust periods are more reliant on lottery tax windfalls.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1987) summarizes the stringency
of each state’s balanced budget amendment by assigning states an ACIR score between zero
and ten. A higher ACIR score corresponds to a more stringent balanced budget amendment.
Variation in the ACIR index accounts for whether a state’s balanced budget amendment is
constitutional or statutory, enforced by an independent or politically appointed judge, and
accompanied by governor veto power. Bohn and Inman (1996) emphasize the stringency
provided by end-of-the-year (not beginning-of-the-year) constitutional budget restrictions (not
statutory) enforced by independent (not politically appointed) state supreme courts.7 Poterba
(1994) uses the ACIR variable to explain the response of fiscal policy to unexpected deficits.
States have also adopted budget stabilization (“rainy day”) funds to institutionalize sav-
ings. Wagner and Elder (2005) describe the deposit and withdrawal rules associated with
stabilization funds, which range from one to five. As with the ACIR index, higher values
denote more stringent requirements. These authors also report that state government expen-
ditures are less volatile in states with stringent budget stabilization fund requirements because
of the rules governing their deposits and withdrawals.
The balanced budget amendment and stabilization fund thresholds that identify a fiscally
constrained state are two and three, respectively. These thresholds define the smallest possible
nonempty subset of states. Specifically, the ACIR index starts from zero but no state is
assigned a one. Therefore, two is the smallest meaningful threshold for the ACIR index. The
smallest value for the deposit and withdrawal rules is one, hence their smallest possible sum
is two and the smallest meaningful threshold for this sum is consequently three. In summary,
states that are not fiscally constrained have the least stringent balanced budget amendments
and the least stringent rules governing their budget stabilization fund.
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics for annual state-level retail sales (con-
sumption), GSP, and SSI expenditures during the 1998 to 2009 sample across all 50 states.
Summary statistics for levels, which vary significantly across states, and log-growth rates that
vary less across states are both presented. In Panel B, summary statistics are reported for
the subset of 41 fiscally constrained states.
As indicated by Panel C of Table 2, lottery participation is counter-cyclical. Consequently,
lottery tax windfalls relative to SSI are larger and more frequent during bust periods than
during boom periods. The larger lottery tax windfalls (relative to SSI) in bust periods mo-
7The National Conference of State Legislatures (2004) estimates that at least 75% of government expen-
ditures are affected by balanced budget amendments. These amendments apply to a state’s general fund,
which defines the majority of its discretionary budget. Bohn and Inman (1996) conclude that balanced budget
amendments are not responsible for transferring general fund deficits into other funds designed for employee
pensions or capital expenditures.
5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2291804
tivates our use of state-year dummy variables that equal one if there is at least one lottery
winner in a state in a particular year. These dummy variables are not related to the amount
of the lottery tax windfall. Consequently, these variables are immune to any difference in the
tax implications of lottery winners opting to receive a lump sum payment or annuity.
3 Empirical Results
Our empirical tests investigate the impact of lottery tax windfalls on growth in state govern-
ment expenditures for social security income and state government revenue as well as growth
in personal incomes. Our focus on SSI expenditures is motivated by these payments being
directed towards households with the most stringent budget constraints. Similarly, we focus
on individual income tax collections since corporate taxes and other fees received by state
governments are not expected to be sensitive to lottery windfalls. After examining the impact
of lottery tax windfalls on SSI expenditures, we examine the consumption implications of
these expenditures as well as the direct link between lottery tax windfalls and consumption.
3.1 Lottery Tax Windfalls, SSI Expenditures, and Consumption
The respective impacts of lottery tax windfalls on SSI expenditures and the impact of both
lottery tax windfalls and SSI expenditures on state-level consumption are reported in Table
3. State-year panel regressions with state and year fixed effects are utilized by this analysis.
Standard errors in these panel regressions are clustered at the state level during the 1998 to
2009 sample period.
The first panel regression investigates the consumption (CON) implications of SSI spending
CONj,t = β1 Bustj,t + β2 Boomj,t + β3 SSIj,t + β4 Bust * SSIj,t + β5 Boom * SSIj,t
+γ1 Statej + γ2 Yeart + εj,t . (1)
where DLWj,t equals one if there is a lottery winner in state j in year t and zero otherwise.
Statej and Yeart refer to state and year fixed effects. A subsequent panel regression
Xj,t = β1 Bustj,t + β2 Boomj,t + β3 DLWj,t + β4 Bust * DLWj,t + β5 Boom * DLWj,t
+γ1 Statej + γ2 Yeart + εj,t (2)
has a dependent variable X that equals state-level consumption, SSI expenditures, personal
income, and individual income tax collections in each year.
According to Table 3, higher state-level SSI expenditures coincide with higher state-level
consumption, although this effect is limited to bust periods since the β4 coefficient is positive
while the β3 and β5 coefficients are insignificant. In particular, the interaction between Bust
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and SSI is 0.2959 (t-statistic of 2.09) when consumption is the independent variable. This
contrasts with a decline in consumption during bust periods that are not accompanied by
lottery tax windfalls since the β1 coefficient is -0.0150 (t-statistic of -2.57).
Table 3 also indicates that state governments use lottery tax windfalls to increase SSI
expenditures, but only in bust periods, as the interaction between the Bust and Lottery
dummy variables has a positive β4 coefficient of 0.0069 (t-statistic of 2.13) when SSI is the
independent variable. This contrasts with SSI payments being lower unconditionally during
bust periods as the β1 coefficient is -0.0052 (t-statistic of -1.96). Thus, while state government
SSI expenditures decline during bust periods in our sample of 41 fiscally constrained states,
they increase in years that coincide with lottery tax windfalls.
An alternative specification replaces the lottery win dummy variables DLW with the dollar-
denominated amount of the lottery tax windfall. The previous interaction between the Bust
and Lottery dummy variables has a positive β4 coefficient of 0.0113 (t-statistic of 1.94). How-
ever, when the dollar-denominated amount of the lottery tax windfall replaces DLW, this
coefficient increases to 12.0461 and becomes more significant (t-statistic of 3.84).
Overall, lottery tax windfalls during bust periods facilitate higher government expenditures
on SSI that increase consumption. However, during boom periods, neither of these lottery
implications are apparent. Consequently, the impact of lottery tax windfalls on government
spending and consumption are limited to bust periods. This evidence is consistent with
household borrowing constraints, especially for SSI recipients, being tighter when economic
growth rates are lower.
The last two columns of Table 3 are consistent with lottery tax windfalls increasing personal
income, but only during bust periods. Indeed, the effect of lottery tax windfalls on personal
income during boom periods is inconsequential. In addition, lottery wins increase individual
income tax collections unconditionally but not during boom or bust periods. The insignificant
impact of lottery wins on individual income tax collections in bust periods may be attributed
to an overall reduction in personal income. Conversely, the decline in individual income tax
collections during boom periods may result from government tax cuts.
3.2 Firm Implications of Lottery Tax Windfalls
To confirm the impact of lottery windfalls on consumption in bust periods, we estimate firm-
quarter panel regressions using single-state retail firms. Single-state firms are identified using
the dataset of Garcia and Norli (2010) while retail firms are identified by SIC codes 5000
through 5999. Firm and year fixed effects are included during the 1998 to 2009 sample period.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level as the source of variation is state-level lottery
wins.
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The results in Panel A of Table 4 are based on the following panel regression
Retaili,t = β1 Bustj,t + β2 Boomj,t + β3 DLWj,t + β4 Bust * DLWj,t + β5 Boom * DLWj,t
+β6 Log(Assets)i,t + β7 DAi,t + β8 MBi,t + γ1 Firmi + γ2 Yeart + εi,t (3)
where Retaili,t denotes the annual revenue or annual earnings of 58 single-state retail firms.
These 58 firms are headquartered in 20 fiscally constrained states, with details recorded in
Panel B. As control variables, we include firm-level debt-to-assets (DA) and market-to-book
(MB) ratios from COMPUSTAT. The former is defined by short-term and long-term debt
divided by non cash assets.
The results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that during bust periods, lottery tax windfalls
increase the revenue and earnings of retail firms operating in states with lottery winners. Both
revenue and earnings are normalized by total assets. In particular, the β4 coefficients for the
interaction of the Bust and Lottery dummy variables are 0.1583 (t-statistic of 2.68) and 0.0789
(t-statistic of 2.51), respectively. Conversely, the β4 coefficients for the interaction in boom
periods is insignificant for earnings and positive for revenue.
3.3 Robustness Tests
Tables 5 reports on several robustness tests. The first robustness test divides our sample of 41
fiscally constrained states into two different subsets. The first subset contains 37 states that
are fiscally constrained and participate in multi-state lotteries. The results in this subset are
nearly identical to our main results in Table 3. The second subset consists of the 9 states that
are not fiscally constrained. Consistent with these state governments having the flexibility
to run large budget deficits in bust periods, lottery tax windfalls do not exert a significant
impact on SSI expenditures or consumption.
Table 6 confirms that lottery tax windfalls increase government expenditures rather than
tax or debt reductions. Unlike SSI payments, total government expenditures do not increase
during bust periods as a result of lottery tax windfalls. This finding is not unexpected as
many government expenditures decline during bust periods due to a combination of balanced
budget amendments and lower government revenue.
We conduct several additional tests to ascertain the robustness of our results in Table 3.
The first robustness test addresses the appropriateness of using boom and bust thresholds
defined during our 1998 to 2009 sample period. To address this issue, we consider thresholds
defined by GSP growth rates during an extended sample period starting in 1963. These
thresholds are utilized in Da, Warachka, and Yun (2013)’s study of state-level fiscal policy.
These alternative boom and bust thresholds yield similar results as those in Table 3.
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The dummy variables for state-year lottery wins are replaced with a fractional count vari-
able. This fractional count variable normalizes the total number of lottery wins in each state
per year by the total number of lottery wins across all states in the same year. When ag-
gregated across states, this state-year fractional count variable sums to one each year and is
consequently not influenced by the counter-cyclical nature of lotteries. The interaction be-
tween lottery tax windfalls defined by this fractional count variable and bust periods continues
to exert a positive influence on consumption.
Two placebo tests confirm the relevance of lottery wins and SSI expenditures to con-
sumption. The first placebo test replaces SSI with government expenditures on highways.
Regressing consumption on the interaction between bust periods and highway expenditures
instead of the interaction between bust periods and SSI expenditures results in an insignificant
coefficient (t-statistic of -0.63). Therefore, the impact of SSI expenditures on consumption
is distinct from other government expenditures, a likely consequence of SSI recipients having
stringent budget constraints.
The second placebo test scrambles the lottery win dummy variables by randomly assigning
them to different years. A total of 1,000 random shuffles are implemented. Only 42 or 4.2% of
these random shuffles produce a significantly positive coefficient for the interaction between
the bust and lottery dummy variables at the 5% level. This percentage is consistent with the
test’s Type I error.
Finally, the time lag between lottery wins and SSI payments is difficult to examine directly
with annual government expenditure data. Although state governments can spend anticipated
lottery tax windfalls immediately since they have access to short-term credit, SSI recipients
cannot consume additional SSI payments until they are received. The month in which each
lottery win occurred is known but few wins occur towards the end of the year. Nonetheless,
replacing SSI in year t with SSI in year t + 1 leads to a marginally significant coefficient for
the interaction between the BUST and DLW variables. Specifically, this coefficient is 0.0043
and has a t-statistic of 1.64. Therefore, there is evidence that lottery wins in year t increases
SSI payments in year t+ 1.
4 Conclusions
Multi-state lotteries provide tax windfalls to states whose residents win the lottery. Although
counter-cyclical, these windfalls occur during a range of economic conditions. These windfalls
can facilitate increased government expenditures or tax reductions. We examine the impact
of these fiscal policy decisions on consumption. In particular, we examine government expen-
ditures on social security income since households receiving this assistance are expected to
have the tightest budget constraints.
9
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We find evidence that lottery tax windfalls increase government expenditures on supple-
mentary security income, but only during bust periods. Furthermore, these higher expen-
ditures on social security income increase consumption. Once again, this finding is limited
to bust periods. In the absence of lottery tax windfalls, state-level expenditures on social
security income and consumption both decline during bust periods. Consequently, lottery tax
windfalls are crucially important to the fiscal policies of state governments and their impact
on consumption. The negligible impact of lottery tax windfalls on consumption during boom
periods is consistent with time-varying household borrowing constraints that bind during bust
periods.
10
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Table 1: State Characteristics
This table reports state-level lottery participation and lottery taxes as well as the average
rates of consumption growth (CON) and average economic growth rates (GSP). The proxy for
state-level consumption is retail sales while GSP denotes gross state product. Social security income
(SSI) denotes state government expenditures on low income households that contain elderly or
disabled individuals. State-level fiscal constraints such as balanced budget amendments along with
the deposit and withdrawal rules of budget stabilization funds are also reported. ACIR is a variable
between zero and ten that increases with the stringency of a state’s balanced budget amendment.
The deposit and withdrawal rules are ranked between one and five.
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Lottery Lottery CON GSP SSI over ACIR Deposit With. Fiscal
State Lottery tax tax growth growth Gov. Expend. index rules rules Constraints
AK No No 0.00% 0.658% 4.891% 0.611% 6 1 1 No
AL No No 0.00% 1.235% 4.007% 3.856% 10 4 1 Yes
AR Yes Yes 7.00% 1.219% 4.171% 3.199% 9 5 5 Yes
AZ Yes Yes 5.00% 0.437% 5.431% 2.038% 10 4 4 Yes
CA Yes No 0.00% 1.125% 4.710% 3.823% 6 2 2 Yes
CO Yes Yes 4.00% 0.106% 5.078% 1.435% 10 3 2 Yes
CT Yes Yes 6.70% 0.998% 3.690% 1.270% 5 2 3 Yes
DE Yes No 0.00% 0.309% 4.760% 1.155% 10 2 3 Yes
FL Yes No 0.00% 0.415% 5.075% 3.235% 10 2 2 Yes
GA Yes Yes 6.00% -0.241% 4.178% 2.793% 10 2 1 Yes
HI No No 0.00% 0.473% 4.370% 1.445% 10 1 3 Yes
IA Yes Yes 5.00% 1.748% 4.057% 1.380% 10 1 1 No
ID Yes Yes 7.80% 1.105% 5.351% 1.706% 10 1 1 No
IL Yes Yes 5.00% 0.848% 3.515% 2.498% 4 2 1 Yes
IN Yes Yes 3.40% 0.486% 3.320% 1.919% 10 4 4 Yes
KS Yes Yes 5.00% 0.804% 4.197% 1.576% 10 3 1 Yes
KY Yes Yes 6.00% 0.629% 3.206% 4.217% 10 2 1 Yes
LA Yes Yes 5.00% 2.444% 4.643% 3.609% 4 2 1 Yes
MA Yes Yes 5.00% 0.847% 3.978% 2.471% 3 2 1 Yes
MD Yes Yes 8.50% 0.469% 5.150% 1.814% 6 3 1 Yes
ME Yes Yes 5.00% 1.677% 4.181% 2.060% 9 2 1 Yes
MI Yes Yes 4.35% 0.605% 1.538% 2.265% 6 4 4 Yes
MN Yes Yes 7.25% 0.819% 4.285% 1.212% 8 1 1 No
MO Yes Yes 4.00% 0.793% 3.420% 2.524% 10 1 1 No
MS No No 0.00% 1.294% 3.866% 3.910% 9 1 1 No
MT Yes Yes 6.90% 1.687% 4.971% 1.447% 10 5 5 Yes
NC Yes Yes 7.00% 0.328% 4.895% 2.372% 10 2 1 Yes
ND Yes Yes 5.54% 2.293% 5.777% 0.993% 8 2 4 Yes
NE Yes Yes 5.00% 1.029% 4.369% 1.445% 10 2 2 Yes
NH Yes No 0.00% 1.693% 4.038% 1.190% 2 2 2 Yes
NJ Yes Yes 10.80% 1.717% 3.721% 1.616% 10 2 2 Yes
NM Yes Yes 6.00% 0.720% 3.768% 2.036% 10 2 1 Yes
NV No No 0.00% 0.545% 6.269% 1.779% 4 4 2 Yes
NY Yes Yes 8.97% 2.147% 4.028% 2.756% 3 4 2 Yes
OH Yes Yes 6.00% 0.612% 2.520% 2.237% 10 2 1 Yes
OK Yes Yes 4.00% 1.690% 4.842% 2.414% 10 2 3 Yes
OR Yes Yes 8.00% -0.433% 4.763% 1.542% 8 1 1 No
PA Yes No 0.00% 0.998% 3.713% 2.759% 6 2 3 Yes
RI Yes Yes 7.00% 1.039% 4.387% 2.522% 10 1 2 Yes
SC Yes Yes 7.00% 0.486% 3.978% 2.231% 10 3 2 Yes
SD Yes No 0.00% 1.119% 5.285% 1.776% 10 2 2 Yes
TN Yes No 0.00% 0.444% 3.916% 3.451% 10 3 2 Yes
TX Yes No 0.00% 0.791% 5.242% 2.683% 8 2 2 Yes
UT No No 0.00% 0.466% 5.718% 0.977% 10 2 2 Yes
VA Yes Yes 4.00% 0.930% 5.434% 1.975% 8 4 4 Yes
VT Yes Yes 6.00% 2.528% 3.891% 1.505% 0 2 2 No
WA Yes No 0.00% 1.382% 4.872% 1.842% 8 2 3 Yes
WI Yes Yes 7.75% 0.936% 3.696% 1.535% 6 3 2 Yes
WV Yes Yes 6.50% 2.050% 3.800% 3.930% 10 2 2 Yes
WY No No 0.00% 3.268% 7.108% 0.734% 8 1 1 No
Average 4.13% 1.035% 4.401% 2.155% 8 2.32 2.04
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A reports the number of state-year observations for consumption, gross state product
(GSP), and government expenditures on social security income (SSI). The mean, standard devia-
tion, and median of these observations are reported for all 50 states. Both levels, which vary across
states, and annualized growth rates that vary less across states are reported. Panel B replicates
Panel A using the subset of 41 fiscally constrained states. A state is fiscally constrained if its
ACIR index exceeds two or the sum of the deposit and withdrawal rules pertaining to its budget
stabilization fund exceeds three. In Panel C, lottery tax windfalls in each state are normalized by
government expenditures on social security income (SSI) in the same year. Summary statistics for
these normalized windfalls are then separated into bust and boom periods. These periods are defined
by years in which a state’s GSP growth is in the bottom quintile and top quintile, respectively.
Panel: Summary statistics for all 50 states
Levels Growth rates
N Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median
Consumption 550 15080 17857 9882 1.035% 4.906% 2.555%
GSP 600 230700 279832 142758 4.401% 3.305% 4.596%
SSI 500 746 1232 419 4.180% 2.462% 3.915%
Panel B: Summary statistics for 41 states with fiscal constraints
Levels Growth rates
N Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median
Consumption 451 17011 19067 11621 0.975% 4.956% 2.641%
GSP 492 260144 299167 169309 4.352% 3.051% 4.607%
SSI 410 855 1333 481 4.087% 2.433% 3.688%
Panel C: Lottery tax windfalls / SSI
N Mean Std Dev Median
Bust 141 27.94% 54.78% 12.28%
Boom 78 9.99% 9.40% 7.73%
14
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Table 4: Impact of Lottery Tax Windfalls on Single-State Retail Firms
A total of 58 retail single-state firms in 20 fiscally constrained states are examined from
1998 to 2009. The panel regressions in Panel A use revenue and earnings normalized by assets as
the dependent variable. These panel regressions are implemented with firm and year fixed effects.
However, standard errors are clustered at the state-level since the impact of state-level lottery tax
windfalls are investigated. The log of assets, debt-to-assets ratio, and market-to-book ratio control
for size, leverage, and intangible assets. Boom and bust periods are defined at the state-level as
years in which GSP growth is in the top quintile and bottom quintile, respectively. Panel B contains
the distribution of 58 firm-level observations across the 20 states.
Panel A: Single-state retail firms





Lottery indicator -0.0999* -0.0211
-1.74 -1.10
Bust * Lottery indicator 0.1583** 0.0789**
2.68 2.51
Boom * Lottery indicator 0.1488* 0.0025
2.00 0.11
Log (Assets) -0.1610*** 0.1245***
-3.79 3.78
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Table 6: Lottery Tax Windfalls and Fiscal Policy
Within the subset of 41 fiscally unconstrained states, this table records the impact of lottery
tax windfalls on state-level government revenue, expenditures, and debt. Boom and bust periods
are defined at the state-level as years in which GSP growth is in the top quintile and bottom
quintile, respectively. For the state-year panel regressions, the lottery indicator variables are one if
at least one state resident wins the lottery in a particular year. Both state and year fixed effects are
included, with standard errors clustered at the state level.
Government Government Government
Revenue Expenditures Debt
Bust -0.0174 -0.0070 0.0164
-0.70 -1.22 0.89
Boom -0.0106 0.0091 0.0049
-0.74 1.52 0.28
Lottery indicator -0.0131 0.0146** -0.0059
-0.74 2.44 -0.54
Bust * Lottery indicators -0.0114 -0.0062 0.0106
-0.25 -1.08 0.64
Boom * Lottery indicators 0.0439 -0.0232* 0.0013
1.21 -1.84 0.05
Constant -0.2676*** 0.0518*** 0.0092
-6.92 6.90 0.47
Observations 451 451 451
R-squared 0.626 0.182 0.155
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